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         Abstract 
 
This paper (a revised version of Strathclyde Paper 2004-07) questions the 
thesis (again in fashion) that price flexibility ensures full employment. 
(See most standard macro textbooks.) We make the point that explanation 
of unemployment in terms of price/wage stickiness typified much pre-
Keynesian analysis, but not Keynes’s theory of involuntary 
unemployment. Under uncertainty - an essential aspect of the Keynes 
conception - no set of prices consistent with full employment may 
actually exist: if so, price inflexibility is not the critical obstacle to the 
attainment of full employment. Finally, with respect to current use of the 
AD/AS model, we note that once-rejected ideas have returned to the 
mainstream and that the strong arguments against attribution of 
necessarily beneficent effects to price and wage flexibility, which ought 
to be well-known, seem now to be forgotten. 
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                               Price flexibility and full employment: 
                            barking up the wrong (neoclassical) tree 
 
 
 
        Introduction 
 
At the present time, standard macro textbooks are wont to convey the view that the “natural” 
(default) state of the economy is one of full employment, and that unemployment, 
when it occurs, be considered a temporary, disequilibrium phenomenon resulting from 
stickiness of prices and consequent slowness of the market mechanism in performing its 
equilibrating role. It is taken for granted that any upsetting impact of demand disturbances on 
output and employment will in time be eliminated as the price mechanism “grinds out” the 
appropriate set of relative values. With respect to the history of economic analysis, the 
reader is given to understand that Keynes’s contribution to macro theory was to direct 
attention to disequilibrium conditions in the short run, said to be attributable to wage or price 
stickiness, thereby in effect  complementing the traditional (“classical”) theory which 
was concerned primarily with the long-run equilibrium state of the system, with full 
employment assured via wage and price adjustment. 
Take a couple of instances of such textbook pronouncements. One refers to stickiness of 
relative prices, and the other to inflexibility of the general price level; both associate the 
Keynesian tradition with non-adjustment of prices, and both associate the persistence of 
unemployment with inadequate price adjustment. One refers to the price of labour (the real 
wage rate), the other to the general level of prices. 
The classical supply curve is based on the belief that the labour market works 
smoothly, always maintaining full employment of the labour force. Movements 
in the wage are the mechanism through which full employment is maintained. 
The Keynesian aggregate supply curve is instead based on the assumption that 
the wage does not change much or at all when there is unemployment, and 
thus that unemployment can continue for some time.                                                                                                   
                                                                              (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1990, p.235) 
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We can now see the key difference between the Keynesian and classical 
approaches to the determination of national income. The Keynesian assumption . 
. . is that the price level is stuck . . . The classical assumption is that the price 
level is flexible . . . The price level adjusts to ensure that national income is 
always at the natural rate. The classical assumption best describes the long 
run . . . The Keynesian assumption best describes the short.        
                                                                                        (Mankiw, 1994, p.275)     
                                         
The fact that such views can be asserted today suggests, on the part of their proponents, a 
lack of familiarity with the course of development of macroeconomic theory together 
with a worrying want of awareness of the powerful arguments which cast doubt on the 
thesis that downward price flexibility guarantees full employment. We believe that a 
review of how thinking on this important issue has evolved may point to a different  
(Keynesian rather than classical) conception which, from the perspective of mainstream 
modern macroeconomics, seems all too frequently overlooked or forgotten. The purpose 
of this paper is therefore to put before the reader a less comfortable interpretation of the 
working of the macro system which calls in question the validity of the fashionable 
presumption that, as far as full employment is concerned, it is all a matter of “getting prices 
right”. 
The old classical orthodoxy 
We begin by going back to the earliest debates as to the cause of unemployment in the 
(then emerging) industrial economy. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, amongst 
those with an interest in economic affairs, controversy broke out over the possibility of a 
general “glut” - of the occurrence of a state of affairs characterised by general 
overproduction relative to demand for output, accompanied by widespread unemployment. 
Advocates of what become the orthodox view (J B Say, James Mill, David Ricardo  and 
J. S. Mill) held that no such general deficiency of planned demand relative to 
productive capacity could ever occur. These ear ly authorities did not  however blame 
observed unemployment  on wage r igidity : their position was rather that a 
macroeconomic problem of g e n e r a l  u n e m p l o y m e n t  o n  a c c o u n t  o f  
insufficient o v e r a l l  demand was simply inconceivable.
1
 ( A s  r e g a r d s  t h e  
o v e r a l l  l e v e l  o f  d e m a n d ,  a l l  t h a t  w a s  a d m i t t e d  w a s  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a  t e m p o r a r y  -  s e l f - c o r r e c t i n g  -  d i s r u p t i o n  o f  
n o r m a l  e c o n o m i c  a c t i v i t y  o n  t h e  o c c a s i o n  o f  a  c o m m e r c i a l  
c r i s i s . )  O r t h o d o x  o p i n i o n  w a s  absolutely confident that the “heretical” 
f e a r  (associated with T R Malthus, Thomas Chalmers and J C L Simonde de Sismondi) of 
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 With, in Ricardo’s phrase, “a sudden change in the channels of trade”, the difficulties of relocating resources 
might mean that adjustment took some time, but, it was believed, a surplus of output in one sector would be 
matched by a shortage elsewhere. 
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“too much” investment creating such expansion of productive capacity as to outrun the 
growth of demand, was totally without foundation either in theory or in fact. While it was of 
course recognised that oversupply of any particular commodity could occur, a general state 
of overproduction across the economy, on account of want of planned demand, was 
(transient crisis conditions aside) deemed impossible. 
Advocates of this position cited “Say’s Law” - the proposition that the very act of 
supplying goods to the market implies a corresponding volume of demand - arguing that a 
producer was desirous either of consuming his own product or of exchanging it for the 
products of others. Essentially, the view was that the desire to purchase could not fail to 
keep up with the volume of goods produced; even if savings were made out of current 
income, such saving would automatically be matched by planned investment. Thus, from the 
orthodox perspective, the understanding was simply that, in the natural course of events, 
demand would grow along with capacity. Orthodox theorists did not admit the possibility of 
an autonomously-occurring deficiency of demand and so did not think in terms     of price 
adjustment of one form or another as preventing or correcting such a state of affairs. 
     
        The neoclassical version: unemployment - “it’s all a matter of getting prices right” 
In the neoclassical era it came to be accepted that imbalances (beyond the circumstances of a 
commercial crisis) between overall demand for output and production capacity could occur 
(as in the course of the trade cycle). These were now attributed to the imperfect working of 
the price mechanism as a means of co-ordinating the actions of individual agents within the 
economy. While the political economy of the old classical economists had been primarily 
concerned with questions concerning the causes and process of economic growth, the 
neoclassical or marginalist economics which came to dominate the scene towards the 
end of the nineteenth century concentrated much more narrowly on the optimising 
behaviour of individual agents.  
The defining characteristic of marginalist theory is to represent economic problems as 
issues of optimal choice. This approach resulted from the deliberate application of 
mathematical reasoning to economic analysis - bringing to economic theory the notions 
of marginal increments and optimisation through marginal adjustment. Individual agents 
within the economy, be they consumers or producers, are depicted as engaging in acts of 
rational choice, balancing marginal benefit against marginal cost. The activities of these 
rational optimisers are understood to be co-ordinated through the price mechanism. Markets 
are presumed to clear, establishing an equilibrium state from which, in the given 
circumstances, no one has any incentive to depart. The marginalist analysis is thus focused 
on the attainment of equilibrium through the working of the market mechanism; 
correspondingly, the solution of a problem - the elimination of some disequilibrium 
situation - is characteristically envisaged in terms of “getting prices right”. 
Initially neoclassical economists, concentrating on microeconomic matters, gave relatively 
little attention to macro problems, but by the 1920s and 1930s an intensive discussion of 
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macro issues had developed. With respect to the employment issue, the old Ricardian 
contention that the natural state of the economic system was one of full employment was 
carried through into the new era, but now with a neoclassical twist. The rationalisation 
brought forward to justify the thesis that the value of planned demand naturally tends to 
equality with the value of output produced was that it is the proper functioning of the price 
mechanism which ensures equality of planned investment with savings out of full 
employment income. Specifically, it was held that the rate of interest served to equate 
savings and planned investment. Establishment of the “natural” rate of interest would 
ensure equilibrium in the savings-investment (loanable funds) market, guaranteeing the 
recirculation as effective demand for output of whatever portion of current income was 
reserved as savings. In that situation saving becomes equivalent to consumption as a source 
of demand.  Keynes (1936, p.19) quotes Marshall to that effect: 
The whole of a man’s income is expended in the purchase of services and of 
commodities. It is indeed commonly said that a man spends some portion of 
his income and saves another. But it is a familiar economic axiom that a man 
purchases labour and commodities with that portion of his income which he 
saves just as much as he does with that he is said to spend. He is said to spend 
when he seeks to obtain present enjoyment from the services and commodities 
which he purchases. He is said to save when he causes the labour and 
commodities which he purchases to be devoted to the production of wealth from 
which he expects to derive the means of enjoyment in the future. 
 
Thus, in the neoclassical era, as had not been the case in classical times, the balancing of 
savings and investment was recognised as potentially problematical, but it was believed that 
the efficient operation of the price mechanism - in the form of the “interest rate mechanism” 
- would (eventually) resolve any problem which might arise. It was accepted however that 
this mechanism did not work with perfect efficiency. Neoclassical writers (e.g. Wicksell, 
Pigou, D.H. Robertson, and the early Keynes) held that slow operation of the interest 
rate mechanism permitted short-term variations in employment and output. If, for instance, 
a change was perceived in investment prospects, the natural rate would alter to maintain 
equality between savings and investment. The trouble was that the actual rate which 
obtained in the market, and to which agents responded, was the “money” rate as set by 
the banks; if the banks were slow in adjusting their rate to the change in investment 
conditions, the money rate would fail to move with the natural rate, resulting in an excess 
or deficiency of investment spending above or below savings. The understanding was that 
an excess  of  intended  investment  over  savings  would  induce  increased  bank  
lending; alternatively, i f  savings exceeded investment, the money supply would fall. 
Spending, it was supposed, would vary with changes in the quantity of money. 
 
What happened next, following an increase or decrease in spending, would depend on the 
degree of money wage and price flexibility. If, with full flexibility, all money values 
responded immediately and proportionately to the monetary change, the price level would 
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alter without any impact on output and employment. But if, as was considered more 
likely, commodity prices altered more quickly than money wages, real wages would be 
affected, resulting in changes in employment and output. In time, of course, once the 
money rate caught up with the natural rate and real wages were restored to their “proper” 
value, activity would return to its normal level. The cyclical unemployment associated 
with such a sequence of events could t h e r e f o r e  be classified as frictional – 
attributable to slow adjustment of the rate of interest (“the price of capital”) and slow 
adjustment of the money (and, so it was believed, real) wage rate (the price of labour). 
In the inter-war period, however, it became evident to Professor Pigou that the abnormally 
high and prolonged unemployment then being suffered in Britain and  e l sewh er e  
ac ross  t he  indus t r i a l  wor ld  represented something other than the regular 
fluctuations of the trade cycle as experienced in earlier years. Temporary 
malfunctioning of the interest rate mechanism did not seem sufficient to account for the 
current problem of persisting unemployment. But Pigou still interpreted the situation as a 
problem with prices - specifically the price of labour services. His diagnosis (presented in 
his 1933 Theory of Unemployment) was that the distressing contemporary situation could be 
understood only as the result of an unduly (and persistingly) high level of real wages; Pigou 
(1933, p.256) surmised that, after the dramatic changes in prices and money wages during 
the war and immediate post-war years, the level of money wages (and so real wages) had 
got “stuck” in an inappropriate relationship to the level of commodity prices. 
Since the post-Armistice boom, however, the unemployment situation has 
been very different from what it was before the war. Instead of a percentage 
of unemployment amounting, on the average of good and bad years, to some 
41/2 per cent, post-war unemployment has moved from a mean from twice to 
three times as large as this. This circumstance suggests strongly that the goal of 
long-run tendencies in recent times has been a wage level substantially above 
that proper to nil unemployment, and that a substantial part of post-war 
unemployment is attributable to that fact. 
 
In other words, workers, maintaining the going level of money wages (and with these, 
real wages), were pricing themselves out of employment. The consequent unemployment 
could be described as being, in effect, “voluntary”. The remedy proposed was, in modern 
parlance, “to get prices right” by engineering a cut in real wages.  Pigou, apparently 
taking it for granted that the interest rate mechanism would, in principle, ensure equality 
of planned spending with the value of output produced (i.e. tacitly subscribing to Say’s 
Law) was confident that employment would then increase as, with lower wages, firms 
would move down their “labour demand” (marginal product of labour) schedules. 
As to the practicability of this strategy, careful assessment of production conditions led 
Pigou (1933, p.106) to the conclusion that what he called the “real demand function for 
labour” was fairly elastic, implying that no very great reduction in real wages was 
required to boost employment to a satisfactory level. 
7  
. . . we may, therefore, not unreasonably put the elasticity of the money demand 
for labour in times of deep depression at not less numerically than -1.5. . . . 
We have thus margin enough for a fairly confident claim that, in times of deep 
depression, after an interval not less than the period of production of the 
generality of wage-goods and export goods, an all-round cut of 10 per cent in 
money rates of wages2 would lead, other things being equal, to a more than 10 
per cent expansion in the aggregate volume of labour demanded, and so, apart 
from unfilled vacancies, in the volume of employment. 
It was specifically on Pigou’s Theory of Unemployment, and his diagnosis that the root 
of the trouble lay in the labour market  -  stickiness  of  real wages being responsible for 
the continuing high unemployment of the period - that Keynes set his sights as constituting 
the fullest and most explicit statement of what he understood to be the “classical” position. 
 
The Keynes theory 
 
By the mid-1930s Keynes had eventually arrived, in his own mind, at an understanding of 
what was wrong with the traditional approach  and  what  was  needed  in  its  place.  As  
       Keynes saw the situation, the classical theory had failed to provide a believable explanation 
of the major contemporary economic problem – the high and persisting unemployment 
affecting Britain and other industrial countries. The classical theory was, in his opinion, 
incapable of comprehending the true nature of the trouble. 
 
In addition to “frictional” unemployment, (the classical theory) is also 
compatible with “voluntary” unemployment due to the refusal or inability of a 
unit of labour, as a result of legislation or social practices or of combination 
for collective bargaining or of slow response to change or of mere human 
obstinacy, to accept a reward corresponding to the value of the product 
attributable to its marginal productivity. But these two categories of “frictional” 
unemployment and “voluntary” unemployment are comprehensive. The classical 
postulates do not admit of the possibility of the third category which I shall 
define . . . as “involuntary” unemployment.3
                                                                                                                                                       
       ____________________  
2 
It should be emphasised here that Pigou of course held that employment was a function of the real wage; in 
keeping with that understanding, by this stage in his argument he had already attempted to take into account 
“what changes in rates of real wages are implied by given changes in money wages”. (Pigou, 1933, II, x). He 
concluded that the required changes in money wages were not too large to be feasible. 
3 Keynes’s famously obscure definition of involuntary unemployment (1936, p.15) reads thus: “Men are 
involuntarily unemployed if, in the event of a small rise in the price of wage-goods relatively to the money 
wage, both the aggregate supply of labour willing to work for the current money-wage and the aggregate 
demand for it at that wage would be greater than the existing volume of employment”. The essential point is 
that (in terms of the labour-market diagram) Keynes envisages, with deficient demand and unemployment, a 
difference (diagramatically, a gap) existing,  at  the  going  full-employment  rate  of  wages,  between  the  
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Keynes’s explanation of the occurrence of involuntary unemployment depended on his 
identifying aggregate demand for output, not conditions of labour supply, as the key 
determinant of levels of output and employment within the economy. Aggregate 
demand was no longer treated as a “tame” variable, ultimately tied to the value of output 
supplied. If there happened to be insufficient demand within the system to justify full 
employment, workers would find themselves, against their wishes, out of a job, even if the 
terms on which they sought work were perfectly compatible with their employment under 
other conditions of demand. Demand for labour is derived demand. The problem was not, as 
Pigou viewed it, one of wages being stuck at an inappropriate real level, but the quite 
different one of insufficient planned demand for output. 
 
In the General Theory Keynes emphatically made the point that unemployment was not due 
to excessive real wages – employment (or the lack of it) depended  on  the  demand  for  the 
product, not on the wages paid to labour. In fact, if there was a relationship between real 
wages and employment it actually ran, he argued, in the opposite direction from that 
supposed by the conventional theory. What Keynes suggested was that when firms cut back 
on production, laying off workers, these firms move leftwards down their short-run supply 
curves, so that if prices were then falling, with no change in money wages, the cost of living 
would consequently be falling and real wages rising. It was the emergence of unemployment 
that was responsible for the increase in real wages, not vice versa. From Keynes’s 
perspective any such increase in wages was no more than a natural and incidental 
consequence of industrial contraction; it, categorically, was not the cause. 
 
A year or two later Keynes (Keynes, 1939) was able to eliminate from his analysis this 
potentially confusing association of changes in employment with changes in wages. It 
appeared, according to empirical evidence, that when employment fell, prices did not move 
relative to money wages as he (relying on conventional neoclassical theory) had supposed. 
Thus, if real wages did not in fact increase as employment fell, it was should now be 
unambiguously clear - even to the most dyed-in-the-wool classical observer – that 
unemployment was occurring simply and directly because want of demand for the product 
of labour meant want of demand for the services of labour. Wages didn’t come into it. Thus 
Keynes severed a conventional theoretical link between employment and the price of labour, 
directing attention away from wage inflexibility to the state of demand in the markets for the 
produce of labour. 
 
In the Keynes theory the adequacy of intended aggregate demand for output is the key 
strategic variable. Keynes rejected both the rationalisations previously offered for not 
worrying about the adequacy of aggregate demand. He saw demand as independent of 
supply, as an unstable and unreliable factor reflecting the expenditure plans of consumers 
______________________ 
 
quantity of labour available for employment and the quantity actually demanded by employers; the fact that 
labour is “off its supply curve” is indicative of the involuntary nature of that unemployment. 
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and investors: there was no guarantee,  as  old authorities such as Ricardo and J S Mill 
had supposed, that the very act of production  implied  demand  - that the value of 
planned expenditures would naturally and automatically match the value of output 
produced.  
 
Fundamental to Keynes’s “general theory” is his appreciation that the economy exists and 
functions within real historical time, implying that wealth-seeking agents must necessarily 
make decisions respecting asset choice under conditions of uncertainty. Uncertainty, as 
faced by decision- makers in the real world, cannot generally be reduced to calculable, 
and insurable risk. T h i s ,  i n  K e y n e s ’ s  o p i n i o n ,  w a s  a  f u n d a m e n t a l  
m a t t e r  w h i c h  h i s  p r e d e c e s s o r s  h a d  g o t  w r o n g . Thus Keynes (1937), 
differentiating his conception of the situation from that of the “classics” (present and past), 
argued that his contemporaries: 
. . . like their predecessors, were dealing with a system in which the amount 
of the factors employed was given and other relevant facts were known more 
or less for certain. This does not mean that they were dealing with a system in 
which change was ruled out, or even one in which the disappointment of 
expectation was ruled out. But, at any given time, facts and expectations were 
assumed to be given in a definite and calculable form, and risks, of which, 
though admitted, no much notice was taken, were supposed to be capable of 
exact actuarial computation. The calculus of probability, though kept in the 
background, was supposed to be capable of reducing uncertainty to the 
same calculable status as certainty itself; 
       And he goes on to charge “classical” economic theory with being 
. . .  one of those pretty, polite techniques which tries to deal with the present by   
abstracting from the fact that we know very little about the future. 
That the General Theory is macroeconomics for a world of uncertainty is evident from the 
importance Keynes attributes to expectations and states of confidence as affecting the 
behaviour of decision makers, as regards both choice amongst financial assets and the 
purchase of produced commodities. The fact that decisions have to be made without 
decision-makers being sure of the eventual outcome is central to Keynes’s vision of the 
working of the system: the economy is viewed not as a closed mechanical system, but as 
one which is “open-ended” in that there can never exist a complete set of markets such that 
all risks and uncertainties are eliminated by insurance; hopes and fears, imagination and 
guess-work cannot in the real world be excluded as determining factors in the working of 
the economic system. Investors may prefer to retain liquidity, rather than commit resources 
to projects whose prospects are deemed too doubtful. Demand for output, depending on all 
these subjective and unstable factors is likely to be subject to periods of optimism and 
depression, of boom and slump. 
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Nor was it the case, Keynes argued, t h a t  r e l i an ce  could be placed on the neoclassical 
notion of the “interest rate mechanism” as a means of reconciling current savings and 
intended investment at a full employment level. According to his new theory of liquidity 
preference, the role of the rate of interest (a monetary, not a “real” phenomenon) was to 
reconcile asset preferences and demands in the financial markets, and not to equate the value 
of spending on new capital goods with the value of saving. [We can add that the 
neoclassical “productivity and thrift” treatment of interest as equating the demand and 
supply of (new) “capital” is undermined by the “Cambridge critique” which 
demonstrates that to attempt to explain in these terms the rate of interest (“the price of 
capital”), as equal to the marginal product of capital, is logically incoherent.] The traditional 
neoclassical mechanism of macroeconomic equilibration via price (interest rate) adjustment 
was thus ruled out of court. 
 
A possibility of escape from depression via a general fall in prices (and increase in the value 
of money) was mooted, notably by Professor Pigou, and indeed by Keynes himself in the 
General Theory, neither of whom however were optimistic as to the activity-boosting 
implications of general deflation. We return to this issue below, but for the moment note 
Keynes’s own thoughts on the matter. 
 
Keynes considered carefully the question of whether downward wage and price flexibility 
would help to get the economy out of a demand-deficient state of slump. From his 
perspective, any mechanism to counter unemployment would have to work via a stimulus to 
demand: he concluded that neither real wage reductions (even if such could be 
achieved), nor falling money wages and prices, would help; either would probably make 
the situation worse.
 
The economy could not, he believed, be regarded as possessing an 
automatic and reliable “self-righting” capability: government intervention, possibly in the 
role of “pump-priming”, was indicated as necessary to get things moving.  
 
He explained his reasons for favouring price stability over deflation in recession conditions 
(1936, pp.269-70): 
 
     . . . if labour were to respond to conditions of gradually diminishing 
employment by offering its services at a gradually diminishing money-wage . . . 
[t]he chief result of this policy would be to cause a great instability of prices, so 
violent perhaps as to make business calculations futile in an economic society 
functioning after the manner of that in which we live. To suppose that a flexible 
wage policy is a right and proper adjunct of a system which on thw whole is one 
of laissez-faire, is the opposite of the truth. . . . In the light of these 
considerations I am now of the opinion that the maintenance of a stable level of 
money-wages is, on a balance of considerations, the most advisable policy for a 
closed system; whilst the same conclusion will hold good for a open system, 
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provided that equilibrium with the rest of the world can be secured by means of 
fluctuating exchanges. There are advantages in some degree of flexibility in the 
wages of particular industries so as to expedite transfers from those which are 
relatively declining to those which are relatively expanding. But the money-
wage level as a whole should be maintained as stable as possible, at any rate in 
the short period. 
 
Again, as an emergency means of macro stabilization, another form of price adjustment is – 
from the Keynesian position – firmly rejected. 
 
Thus, to sum upon the Keynes perspective: Keynes accepted none of the three forms of price 
adjustment traditionally expected (or more recently proposed) as means of ensuring full 
employment within the economy. The idea of the so-called “interest rate mechanism” 
reflected a misconception about the nature and role of the rate of interest: interest rate 
adjustment could not therefore be expected to ensure maintenance of the income-
expenditure flow at the full-employment volume. In the labour market demand for labour 
should be seen as derived demand - depending on conditions in the product markets, not 
simply on the real wage existing in the labour market. Finally, in Keynes’s considered 
opinion, a general deflation of money wages and prices could not be regarded as a practical 
route to recovery from recession. A set of prices Keynes did regard as critical in determining 
levels of output and employment were the values attached by entrepreneurs to new 
producers’ goods in which they might invest. The problem with these was that such 
valuations, depending on unstable and unreliable factors of confidence and expectations, 
were likely to be variable, and independent, in the sense of there being no reason that they 
should correspond to the volume of investment spending which would match savings out of 
the full employment level of income. 
 
After Keynes 
 
The Keynesian theory pretty quickly became established (at least for the next thirty plus 
years) as the new orthodoxy: a completely novel body of economic analysis – modern 
macroeconomics - developed. Prominent in this new literature was the Hicks-Hansen IS/LM 
model which, integrating the income-expenditure and monetary elements of Keynes’s 
system in a convenient diagram, was generally accepted as satisfactorily representing the 
essentials of the Keynesian conception. Until the late 1960s, Keynesian theory, although 
not unchallenged, formed the basis of mainstream macroeconomics. 
 
What challenges to mainstream Keynesian orthodoxy that there were in the early years, 
although coming from sometimes hostile traditionalists, nevertheless implied acceptance 
of the essential Keynes proposition that aggregate demand was what mattered with respect 
to the determination of output and employment. The fact that attention was directed to the 
determination of demand rather than, as in previous times, to the level of real wages or to 
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disparity between the “natural” and money rates of interest indicated just how generally 
and profoundly thinking had been changed by the publication of the General Theory. 
 
One line of criticism built on the notion of the “wealth” or “Pigou effect” as providing a 
possible automatic rescue-mechanism - the relevance of which (as noted above) Keynes had 
denied - for an economy sunk in heavy unemployment. The argument was that lower prices 
would increase the real value of the nominal money stock, thus generating a positive 
wealth effect on household spending; if, the argument went, prices could fall far enough, 
then aggregate demand would be boosted to full employment level, regardless of any 
liquidity trap or of interest inelasticity of investment demand. While this purely notional 
adjustment mechanism featured in the textbooks,  it was  however  explicitly  recognised
  
by  
theorists who explored this real-balance route (Pigou himself, Patinkin
4
 – not to mention 
Keynes) that the weakness of the wealth effect on consumption, and even more 
importantly, the damaging expectational effects on demand likely to result from a process of 
deflation, ruled this effect out of court as a practical equilibrating mechanism. It was agreed 
that downward adjustment of money wages in a depression might very well make things 
worse rather than better.  The Japanese experience  of  deflation  in recent times 
ought to have disabused armchair theorists of any idea of recommending 
deflation as a cure for unemployment.
5
 But nevertheless, despite all past 
discussion and recent practical experience, the idea of deflation as a stimulus to 
demand has currently been brought back into mainstream macro teaching, in a central role, 
via use of the fashionable AD/AS model (of which more below). 
_______________________
 
4
 We may quote Patinkin (1959, pp.582-87) on this: “The automatic adjustment process of the market 
is too unreliable to serve as the practical basis of a full-employment policy.  In  other  words,  though  the  real 
balance effect must be taken account of in our theoretical analysis, it is too weak - and, in some cases (due to 
adverse expectations) too perverse - to fulfil a significant role in our policy considerations. 
5  Reason to be skeptical of the argument that a process of deflation can have a positive effect on demand and 
employment is furnished by recent experience in Japan, where falling prices have not rescued the economy 
from recession. Thus J H Makin (2006) an informed observer of the Japanese science writes: 
 Deflation is dangerous. The nightmare of a deflationary spiral arises from the fact that as 
deflation intensifies and prices fall more rapidly, the real cost of borrowing rises. With a zero 
interest rate and 1 per cent deflation, the real cost of borrowing is 1 per cent. If deflation 
intensifies to 2 per cent, while the demand  to  hold cash strengthens because the  rise  in  
deflation  represents a  rising,  risk-free,  tax-free return on  cash,  more cash  will be demanded.  
The  move  into  cash  further  depresses  spending,  and thereby further intensifies deflation. The 
real cost of borrowing keeps rising, imparting an accelerating drag on the economy. . . . As 
noted, a deflationary spiral produces a sharp increase in the demand for liquidity that, if not 
satisfied by the central bank, will be satisfied by households and businesses selling goods and 
services, thereby intensifying the deflationary spiral. 
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Walrasian macroeconomics 
Keynes’s understanding that the elimination of unemployment is not simply a matter of 
“getting prices right” can - perhaps surprisingly - be supported by an implication of what 
we may call “Walrasian macroeconomics”. The point can be made, as it has by Michio 
Morishima, the distinguished Japanese economist, that, in a Walrasian-type macroeconomic 
model, more than flexibility of prices is required to guarantee full employment. Even if prices 
are fully flexible, that may not be enough to ensure that the system will naturally tend to 
equilibrium at full employment. His argument is concerned not with the stability of 
equilibrium (whether the system if upset will return to equilibrium), but to a question not 
normally raised - the existence of equilibrium (the existence of a set of values at which all 
markets in the system can be simultaneously in equilibrium). Let us examine first of all the 
characteristics of a “Walrasian macro model” and then turn to Morishima’s (rather neglected) 
thesis. 
Over the last seventy years the Walrasian general equilibrium model has been adopted by 
neoclassical theorists as the most appropriate conceptualisation and representation of the 
economic system. The neoclassical synthesis of the 1950s and 1960s was an attempt to 
combine Keynesian and Walrasian contributions; the simplified macroeconomic version of 
the Walrasian s ystem employed in Patinkin’s (1965) Money, Interest and Prices 
exemplifies this approach. Let us make use of such a model, employing it specifically to 
shed light on the question of whether the attainment  and  maintenance of full employment 
is in fact a matter of “getting prices right”. 
First of all, recall the nature of the Walrasian general equilibrium model. The Walrasian 
model shows the economy as a system of inter-related markets, this system being represented 
by a set of simultaneous equations which state the conditions to be satisfied for equilibrium – 
demand equal to supply, or excess demand equal to zero in all markets. Excess demand in 
each market is taken to be a function of the price in that market and of all other prices. Two 
questions are posed: does a set of prices exist which yields simultaneous equilibrium in all 
markets (the issue  of  the existence  of equilibrium)?   And, secondly, if  such  a  set  of  
equil ibrium prices  does exist ,  will   the market   mechanism succeed in 
establishing these prices (the issue of the stability of equilibrium)? 
 
Take a very simple illustration of the nature of the general equilibrium model. Suppose there 
are n goods traded within an economy - specifically 5 goods (in reality there would of 
course be thousands) – call them goods a, b, c, d and e. If we take one of these as the 
numeraire and set the price of one unit of that good at unity (Pe, say, equals 1), there are 
then n - 1 (4) relative prices - Pa, Pb, Pc and Pd in terms of good e - to be determined. 
There are at the same time n (5) equilibrium conditions (n XD equations) to be satisfied. 
It might at first sight appear that we have more determining equations than unknowns (5 
as against 4). In fact, by “Walras’ Law” we actually have only n - 1 (4) independent 
excess demand equations - the same number of equations as unknowns. Conventionally 
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we take it that, with equality in number of unknowns and independent determining 
conditions, it is reasonable to suppose that a solution - a set of prices which yields market-
clearing equilibrium – exists.6 (Furthermore the normal presumption is that price adjustment 
will establish that set of equilibrium prices.)
                                         
 
Let us now reformulate this simple model as a macro model.
7
 Again suppose that there are 5 
markets within the system – but now assume that these are markets for consumption goods 
(C ), capital goods (K), labour (L), bonds (B) and money (M).  It  is  assumed  that the given  
stock of money consists of a certain number of nominal units. Taking money as the 
numeraire,  the  unknowns  are  4  relative  prices (of C, K, L and B)  expressed  in  terms of 
money. (When these 4 prices are specified the value of the money supply, in terms of a 
bundle of goods, M/P is implied.) To determine the 4 unknowns, there are, by Walras’ Law, 
4 independent
 
excess demand equations amongst the 5 excess demand equations of the 
system. Thus we may conclude that it is reasonable to suppose the existence of an 
equilibrium set of prices. (Furthermore, and again following convention, we may 
suppose that the price mechanism works in such a way as to establish that set of prices if 
equilibrium has for any reason been disturbed.) Thus, the model we have here is, in 
conventional neoclassical terms, read as representing a macro system in which price 
adjustments should be capable of establishing full employment equilibrium. If this is taken 
as a parable with something to say about the real world, the moral would seem to be that, 
with a properly functioning price mechanism, full employment may be regarded as the 
natural state of the economy (the corollary being, of course, that persisting disequilibrium 
must be due to inflexibility of prices). 
 
The above model - employing the Walrasian conception in the macro context
 
- simple 
though it is, essentially represents the neoclassical view of the functioning of the 
macroeconomic  system.  That  is   the  conception  of  things   which  underlies  the  almost 
_______________________ 
6 
As equality of unknowns and independent equations does not in fact guarantee a solution, “we have to 
abandon the confidence of Walras for the much less certain hope that there is a unique solution”. (Johnson, 
1971, p.103) That is certainly the usual procedure. Thus Patinkin (1965, p.37): “Now, equality between the 
number of unknowns and the number of independent equations is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition 
for the existence of a solution. Nor does it ensure that solutions, if they do exist, will be only finite in number. 
For our purposes, however,  these  highly complicated issues can  be  ignored.  Instead,  we  shall  accept  such 
equality as justifying the reasonableness of the assumption that one and the same [unique] set of money prices 
can simultaneously create equilibrium in each and every market.” 
 
7 
 Note E R Weintraub (1974, p.15): “In a real sense, macroeconomics is general equilibrium theory with some  
of  the  many  markets  grouped  together for  expositional  clarity and  convenience.  In  a  general equilibrium
 
schema of about 80,000 markets describing the behaviour of all prices within the  economy,  perhaps the  first
 
40,000 markets are for consumer goods, the next 20,000 for capital goods, with 10,000 for labour services, 
10,000 for financial assets, and a few for money. Combining markets for similar goods there is “merely” the 
proble of five markets: consumer goods, investment goods, labour services, financial assets, and money”.
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universal textbook assertion that the Keynesian explanation of unemployment must reside 
in price rigidity, that underlies the New Classical and Rational Expectations accounts of 
(what are said to be at most) temporary deviations from the Natural Rate of Unemployment,  
and indeed underlies the concern of the (so-called) “New Keynesian” school with the 
causes of price stickiness or price rigidity. All these several varieties of macroeconomic 
theorising share the characteristic neoclassical belief - perhaps “faith” would be a better 
word - that the achievement of full employment equilibrium is a matter of “getting prices 
right”. But is it? 
Consider again our simple Walrasian macro model and imagine that initially the situation is 
one of full utilisation of production capacity and full employment. Now suppose there 
occurs a fall in the demand for capital goods. If demand remains low, producers in that 
sector will reduce production  and  cut  employment  and,  as  incomes  fall,  the  recession  
is  transmitted  via the multiplier process throughout the economy. In terms of the 
IS/LM model the IS curve (and possibly the LM curve as well) has moved to the left and 
the economy settles to a new equilibrium with production adjusted to the reduced level of 
aggregate  demand  and  less  labour  employed  than  is  available.  The sum of excess 
demands is then less than zero: demand equals supply in the goods and asset markets, but 
supply exceeds demand in the labour market. 
 
The condition of net excess supply poses a theoretical problem: by Walras’ Law that 
state of affairs is an impossibility - the sum of excess demands ought to equal zero. If, in the 
C, K, B and M markets  excess demand is zero,  then,  according  to  Walras’ Law,  demand  
and supply must be equal in the remaining market - i.e. there must be full equilibrium in the 
labour market. The logic of the conventional analysis rules out the occurrence of this 
situation of depression equilibrium - the existence of an excess supply of labour should 
necessarily imply the simultaneous existence of an equal value of excess demand for 
goods or securities which would directly or indirectly justify increased production. But in 
reality we can readily envisage such “slump conditions” in  which  labour  is  unemployed 
while demand equals supply everywhere else in the system. Potential demand for goods has 
“evaporated” into a desire for liquidity. Walras’ Law evidently doesn’t square with that 
perception. 
 
The possible emergence of a net excess supply of labour was picked up by Robert Clower 
(1965) and Axel Leijonhufvud (1968) thirty odd years ago when attempting to capture the 
essence of Keynes’s general theory within a Walrasian  framework. Clower’s  explanation 
of  the occurrence of  such an excess supply of labour - contradicting the prediction of 
Walras’ Law - was that in a money-using economy planned or “notional” demand will 
not become “effective” demand if, because of lack of access to means of payment, agents 
are unable to express their intended demand on the market. In Clower’s example 
unemployed labour has an unsatisfied demand for commodities but, with sales of labour 
services constrained and a consequent want of current income, does not have the 
necessary means of payment to make its demand effective. If, as in the Clower 
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illustration, the real wage is stuck at too high a level, there exists simultaneously an excess 
supply of labour and a notional excess demand for goods, but without any actual pressure 
of demand in the goods market to raise prices relatively to money wages. The conclusion 
reached was that, under disequilibrium conditions, Walras’ Law does not hold good: while 
it is true that taking notional and effective excess demands together the sum of excess 
demands does equal zero, with   respect to effective demand alone as actually expressed in 
the market, the general case is that sum of excess demands is, at most, equal to zero. With 
disequilibrium, net effective excess demand can be negative. Thus, it would appear, the 
conventional Walrasian model fails to comprehend the constraint on effective demand 
which exists in the circumstances of Keynesian “underemployment equilibrium”. 
 
On that basis, recognition of the possibility of negative net excess demand (net excess 
supply) emerging within the economic system was taken by Clower to be the crucial 
feature which differentiates Keynes’s theory from conventional neoclassical theory. Clower 
argued that, even  though  Keynes  framed  his  analysis  in  Marshallian rather  than 
Walrasian terms, that in effect was  the proposition  he  was  advancing  -  that  total  excess 
demand within the economy did not necessarily sum to zero, implying that, with 
unemployment, the potential equilibrating force of positive excess demand need not in fact 
be operating to propel relative values towards a configuration consistent with full 
employment equilibrium.
 
 
 
What do we make of this interpretation of the nature of Keynes’s theoretical innovation? As 
we read it, Clower did not get to the root of the matter: he seems to have focused on a 
symptom rather than on the cause of depression conditions as understood by Keynes. 
What Clower has formally identified - in terms of Walrasian theory - is simply the 
multiplier phenomenon, which derives from the fact that if labour is thrown out of 
work, purchasing power is reduced and workers’ effective demand for goods and services 
is thereby constrained. The Clower reading of Keynes has nothing to say about the cause 
of such a state of affairs - there is no consideration whatever of the reason why, in the first 
place, workers may have been laid off by their employers. The fact that the remedy as 
envisaged by Clower – a reduction of real wages - is   the same as that proposed by Pigou 
suggests that Clower had not, as he claimed, put his finger on the distinctive feature of 
Keynes’s analysis of unemployment. Clower may have introduced the Keynesian 
multiplier to the Walrasian system, but there is much more than the multiplier in the 
General Theory. 
The state of affairs envisaged by Clower – an economy stuck in unemployment because 
real wages are fixed too high for full employment – does in fact (whatever may have been 
intended) correspond to Pigou’s picture of unemployment equilibrium. If we consider how 
such a Pigouvian situation would appear in Walrasian terms, we shall find a pointer to how 
the Keynesian conception may more adequately be represented in Walrasian terms. 
Pigou takes it for granted that when production is offered on the market, demand 
(temporary, frictional difficulties aside) must be sufficient to take up whatever output is 
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produced by labour of which the marginal product does not fall short of the real wage. 
(That is certainly the implication of treating, a la Pigou, the labour market exactly as 
the market for any final commodity, with equilibrium determined at the point of 
intersection of the demand and supply curves.)  By Walras’ Law, when (in equilibrium) the 
sum of excess demands equals zero, the situation in any one market of the economy can 
be inferred from the conditions prevailing in the rest of the system. Thus, if it happens 
to be the case (thinking of our 5 market model) that demand equals supply in the C, B, M 
and L markets (full employment), demand must also equal supply in the K market. From 
the Pigouvian perspective, so long as labour market conditions (specifically the terms of 
labour supply) remain unaltered, demand for output has to stay fixed at the full employment 
level. If, as Pigou represents the situation, employment is determined (ceteris paribus) in 
the labour market by conditions of labour supply, there is simply no room for an 
independent investment (K demand) function. 
Evident l y,  Clower  has  not  succeeded in  t rans la t ing the  Keynes  theor y 
in to  Walras i an  te rms . The thesis we are about to develop as to how the Keynes theory 
should be interpreted in terms of the Walrasian framework, a thesis which questions not 
the stability of equilibrium in the case of a multi-market economy, but raises doubt 
regarding the very existence of an equilibrium set of values, derives from the original and 
important, but regrettably neglected, contribution by Michio Morishima (1977). Morishima 
directs attention to the possible indeterminacy of the system, on account of there existing 
more conditions of equilibrium than can simultaneously be satisfied. 
 
We have noted that Clower’s attempt to connect the Keynesian and Walrasian models 
seems, though presumably that was not what was intended, to have landed us back in the 
theoretical conception of Professor Pigou. Let us see if we can find instead a Keynesian 
perspective. If, to break out of the Say’s Law world implicitly assumed by Pigou, we 
introduce an independent investment function into our 5 market Walrasian system, the 
situation is significantly altered. It can no longer be assumed that if conditions are as 
specified in the C, B, M and L markets, the state of affairs in the K market is also 
determinate: we are now allowing the K market to go its own way – for the demand for 
K goods to reflect investors’ views of the future, for their expectations and confidence 
to determine the orders placed, rather than for the volume of these orders automatically to 
correspond to the output available from the K goods industry.
  
There  is now an “un-tamed” 
aggregate investment function; consequently we now have 5 independent equilibrium 
conditions to determine the 4 unknowns (relative values) within the economy. The system 
is overdetermined.
8
  It  is  now  possible  that  the  volume  of  planned  investment spending    
_________________________ 
8
 If it is “reasonable” to suppose that, with an equal number of independent equations and unknowns, that a 
solution exists, it may be correspondingly reasonable to doubt the existence of a solution when the number of 
independent equations exceeds the number of unknowns.“[If, with more equations than variables, the 
equations are linear and independent, they cannot be consistent.] If the equations are linear and inconsistent . . . 
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corresponding to the forecasts and valuations of investors and may not be such as to, at the 
same time, take up the resources left available for investment by demand elsewhere in the 
economy. That being so, there may be no solution to be found by price adjustment; if the 
system is overdetermined and no equilibrium set of prices exists, no matter how flexible 
wages and prices may be, there is no guarantee that unemployment can be eliminated 
through the free functioning of the market mechanism.
9  
 
If that is so, the root of the p r o b l e m  l i e s  not in imperfect working of the price 
mechanism, but more deeply - in the existence of a fundamental inconsistency within the 
economy. It is not that price stickiness is preventing the emergence of the set of prices which 
would ensure full co-ordination of all plans within the economy to produce, consume, save 
and invest. Rather, the parameters of the system are incompatible: that is to say, it is 
perfectly feasible that current plans to sell labour services and current plans to purchase 
commodities, including the purchase of new producers’ goods, are simply irreconcilable. 
Without significant revision of investors’ expectations, state of confidence and spending 
plans, price changes, reflecting market imbalances, will not bring equilibrium. 
 
The prices - valuations - of assets, both real and financial, themselves may in fact be 
anything but sticky, all the time reflecting changes in the multifarious factors affecting the 
views of asset holders and investors, but there is nothing in the system to ensure that the 
resulting investment demand function (or aggregate demand function) automatically falls 
into line with the notional equilibrium investment (or aggregate)  demand  function  which  
would  be implicit in a closed Walrasian system. The point is that these asset values are free 
to respond to all the considerations in the minds of asset holders and investors – they are not 
fixed, as would be required by Walras’ Law (or Say’s Law) in order that investment 
spending exactly matches savings made out of current income. 
 
Thus, freeing aggregate demand from  the constraint of  Say’s Law  (as  represented  by  the 
supposition of a “tame” investment function), we can no longer presume the existence 
_____________________ 
then there is no solution. If the equations are not all linear, no general statement can be made.” From C  F 
Christ, “An aside on counting variables and equations in systems of simultaneous equations”, quoted by H G 
Johnson. 
9
 Morishima (1977, p.95), observes that a “neoclassical full employment” situation is based on the assumption 
that  “aggregate  investment  is  perfectly flexible;  that  is to  say  the  system  lacks  a   non-trivial  investment  
           function, whereas it has a well-defined savings function. . . . It is really because of this  lack  of  an  
investment function that investment can smoothly and quickly be adjusted to savings in our model and not vice 
versa. Such an economy, with perfectly flexible investment, is said to satisfy Say’s law. With this law, there is 
no obstacle to full employment equilibrium. It is indeed because of the premise of Say’s law that neoclassical 
economists could be confident of full employment equilibrium; therefore, it was a prime target of Keynes’ 
attack. In fact, he rejected the perfect flexibility of investment by introducing an investment function; then 
he found that the system was over-determined and full employment was not attainable.” 
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of a solution in the form of a set of market-clearing prices.  Price flexibility is not then the 
key to the attainment of full employment equilibrium. What is critical is the consistency of 
the parameters – in the Keynes case, of the planned volume of effective demand with 
production capacity. 
 
Morishima (1977, pp.115-6) compares (in effect) the Pigouvian and Keynesian visions: 
 
Suppose . . . that Say’s Law is true. Then there exists a neoclassical full-
employment, full-capacity equilibrium. Even in this case, if the wage is set 
[above the full-employment level], then no forces work to move the economy 
towards the equilibrium, because of the downwards rigidity of the wage rate. 
That is to say, the neoclassical equilibrium is prevented from prevailing in spite 
of its existence. If this were the case, we might ascribe the causes of 
unemployment to the  downwards rigidity of wages and hence to the trade 
unions. Keynes, however, opposed this view; he believed that the neoclassical 
full- employment, full-capacity equilibrium does not exist, because investment is 
determined independently of savings and, therefore, even if the wage is perfectly  
flexible, the economy cannot settle down at any point because of the 
overdeterminacy. Only the downwards rigidity stops this endless fluctuation, but 
is not the cause of under-employment because the removal of  i t  will not lead 
to full employment. . . . Keynesian unemployment is the particular 
unemployment which corresponds to that level of savings which equals the 
level of investment independently determined. 
 
The reason why the investment demand function must (in a realistic context) be 
treated as independent – and not automatically consistent with full-employment savings - is 
that investment decisions are – a central point of the Keynes theory – made under 
conditions of uncertainty. This means irreducible uncertainty, not risk such as can be 
covered by insurance. If the uncertainties respecting the returns to be got from investment 
could be eliminated by forward trading or insurance, then there would never be any case 
from holding back from investment so long as the physical conditions of production were 
capable of yielding profit. But if there is no way of ensuring that all possibilities of loss 
are excluded by making suitable arrangements, then investment must depend on the 
subjective factors - expectations, confidence in these expectations, hopes and fears – that 
enter into the investor’s decision- making. Agents have to make up their own minds as to 
the best course of action, and the outcome may well, ceteris paribus, not correspond with 
what is required for full employment. 
This is the point at which we come up against the fact that economics is, as Keynes 
regarded it, a “moral” science and not a natural science: the investor’s decision is a 
human decision and should  not  be treated as a link  in  a  purely  mechanical  sequence  
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whereby whatever resources are left aside from current use are automatically channelled to 
investment.
10
 
Frank Hahn (1982), discussing the implications for the Walrasian general equilibrium 
system of allowing for uncertainty, makes in effect the same point – that in a Keynesian 
world, in which expectations play a critical role, the attainment of full equilibrium 
cannot be guaranteed. He points out that the existence of irreducible uncertainty means that 
a complete set of markets, such that the entrepreneur can eliminate all possibility of loss, 
will not exist. The consequences are serious: “if the invisible hand is to operate there 
must be sufficient opportunities for intertemporal and contingent intertemporal trade. . . . 
The lack of contingent markets means that the market economy is associated with more 
uncertainty than pure theory allows. The lack of intertemporal markets means that great 
weight must rest on market expectations.” In such circumstances the system is, rather than 
being completely interdependent, “open-ended” in that the outcome (the state of  
the economy) depends  on  subjective, essentially  independent rather than internal   
factors.  Hahn  remarks that “Keynes . . . placed great emphasis on the fact that he did 
not invoke [the complete markets postulate]”. 
 
The significance of our investigating in terms of the Walrasian framework the implications 
of the Keynes theory is that it becomes formally evident that in the case of a multi-
market economic system operating in real world conditions of uncertainty, there can be 
no guarantee that in all circumstances an equilibrium solution (in the form of a market-
clearing set of prices) actually exists. In a world of uncertainty asset values, incompatible 
with the rest of the system, are generated in reflection of the hopes and fears in the minds of 
asset-holders. Given such values, asset choices may result in volumes of investment 
spending and employment irreconcilable with existing intentions to sell labour services. 
Demand for labour is then deficient. This finding confirms Keynes’s message that the 
degree of wage and price flexibility is not the critical factor to which attention should be 
directed in the analysis of unemployment. It is of course important that prices adjust to 
reflect changes in conditions of demand and supply, but it cannot be assumed that price 
changes – changes in wages or the price level – will be effective in inducing a compensating 
adjustment of aggregate demand in the event of a general downturn in the economy.  
 
_________________________ 
  
 10
  Keynes (1973, p.300):  “I want to emphasise strongly the point about economics being a moral science [and 
not a natural science]. I mentioned before that it deals with introspection and values. I might have added that it 
deals with motives, expectations,psychological uncertainties. One has to be constantly on guard against treating 
the material as consistent and homogeneous. It is as though the fall of the apple to the ground depended on the 
apple’s motivation, on whether not is worth falling to the ground, and whether the ground wanted the apple to 
fall, and on mistaken calculations on the part of rhe apple as to how far it was from the centre of the earth.” 
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A non-Walrasian framework 
 
In order to deal with the conventional neoclassical wisdom on its own terms, we have 
discussed the issue of Say’s Law and over-determinancy with reference to a Walrasian-type 
model. It would however be more appropriate to set the Keynesian argument within the 
framework of a classical (old-classical) model which is explicitly of a surplus-producing 
economic system. Using such a framework, exactly the same point can be made with 
respect to the stability of the income-expenditure circular flow - that  rejection of Say’s Law  
calls in question the presumption that full employment equilibrium can necessarily be 
achieved via price changes which establish a set of equilibrium prices implicit in the 
structure of the system. Consider the following illustration. 
 
Imagine a simple classical-type surplus-producing economy, modelled a la Sraffa as an 
input-output system with given technical coefficients, which each period reproduces, with  a  
surplus, the inputs required in production. Suppose that, in total, n goods and services - 
including intermediate goods, final consumption goods and investment goods - are 
produced with, as mentioned, output in excess of what is required to replace everything, 
including the wages of the workforce, used up in the course of production. For 
equilibrium in the product markets, it is not enough simply that demand equals supply: 
quantities demanded and supplied must be such that long run equilibrium prices (classical 
“natural values”) obtain with prices which cover costs of production including profit at the 
going rate. Suppose that a certain supply of labour is offered for employment, and that 
the rate of real wages is determined by institutional factors at a conventional level. That 
wage must imply also, given the physical rate of surplus productivity, a determinate rate of 
realised profit at the full employment level of activity. Suppose too that money (a certain 
nominal supply being given) is used within the economy as the medium of exchange. 
We take it that all wage income is automatically spent on consumption goods and that 
profits are put to the acquisition of new producer goods. 
 
In analyzing the properties of a surplus-producing system of this basic sort and the 
determination of equilibrium values therein Sraffa abstracted from all Keynesian issues of 
macroeconomic stability. These were not the questions with which he was concerned. Sraffa 
supposed incomes – wages and profits - generated in production to be fully expended in 
purchasing the current output.  The situation envisaged is that expenditures on finished wage 
goods and producers’ goods (investment goods) fully recompense the entrepreneurs for 
purchases of labour services and produced inputs: at the conclusion of the cycle of 
production all input costs – of materials and of wages and profits (at going rates) have been 
recovered from sales.  
 
Relative prices, wages and the rate of profit correspond to the specified conditions of 
equilibrium. If there are n single-product industries in the system there are n – 1 independent 
price-cost equations (comprehending the input-output structure of the system) and one 
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extraneously given condition which determines the distribution of the surplus income of the 
economy (stating either the going rate of profit or, the other side of the coin, the going rate 
of real wages). For equilibrium demand for labour (directly depending on volume of 
production in each sector) must also equal the given supply; and (real) money demand (for 
transactions purposes) be equal to money supply. Thus, again counting equations and 
unknowns, we have n + 2 independent conditions/equations to determine n - 1 relative 
commodity prices plus either the wage rate (w) or the rate of profit (r), together with 
equilibrium conditions for labour and money (n + 2 unknowns). Thus again, we have a 
picture of a system in equilibrium, in which a certain number of unknowns are matched by 
an equal number of determining conditions. Satisfaction of these conditions ensures the 
internal consistency of the system. 
 
There is no scope in this simple economy for the occurrence of any sort of macroeconomic 
disequilibrium – for the reason that the agents in this economy are constrained by the rule 
that all income they receive goes back directly and immediately on the purchase of either 
consumption goods or producer goods. In each individual commodity market a quantity of 
output is produced and offered for sale at a price which just covers costs of production 
including profits. Whether it is supposed that by some past process of trial and error the 
pattern of production has been adapted to the pattern of demand, we are not informed, and 
anyhow that is not important: all that matters is that supply is fully adapted to demand. We 
may say of this situation, with all profits being intentionally spent on new producers’ goods, 
that saving is being matched by planned investment – which, of course, ensures 
macroeconomic equilibrium.  We can further say that intended investment takes up all 
current savings because, under the circumstances supposed, the agents (capitalists / 
entrepreneurs?) concerned have no alternative plans. In other words, as far as the capitalist, 
profit-earning class are concerned, what we might call their (aggregated) investment 
function is “tame”; that is to say, they (automatically) desire to buy exactly the mix and 
quantities of investment goods that producers wish to sell. If, in the context of counting 
equations and unknowns, we drop out one (of the n) price-cost equation as (by Walras’ Law) 
redundant (leaving n - 1), we can happily miss out that tame aggregate investment function 
(comprehending entrepreneurs’ demands for capital goods) because, of course, it is well and 
truly determined by the remaining elements of the system. 
 
Now give our capitalists some say in the matter – allow them to make investment decisions 
on the basis of the forecasts they make about the profit potential of the investment 
opportunities  they discern, and the hopes or fears with which they make them. If we do this, 
the aggregate investment function (valuations of produced capital goods) is no longer a 
“tame” variable which naturally corresponds to the volume of savings available. Some 
entrepreneurs might wish to invest more, others less than the previously prescribed (hundred 
per cent) of profits received. The condition of macro equilibrium which was previously 
satisfied was that overall investment spending exactly matched total saving – now, while that 
condition of equilibrium remains as before, a new condition has been introduced to the effect 
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that intended investment must correspond to the optimal volume as estimated by all 
entrepreneurs together according to their expectations and confidence – not to their current 
profit receipts. For any – or all – entrepreneurs the profit-maximising course of action may 
not be consistent with the alternative course (investing exactly what they save) which would 
maintain macroeconomic equilibrium. Each agent has freedom to choose his own investment 
plan. Neither the individual investment functions (nor the aggregated function) are certain to 
fit into the system as they were before. To count unknowns and equilibrium conditions again 
- there are now in the case of this system more conditions of equilibrium have to be satisfied 
than there are unknowns. For equilibrium, investment spending has to match savings: for 
entrepreneurial satisfaction, spending on investment goods must also correspond to the 
values placed upon them by entrepreneurs. It may well be that planned investment spending 
cannot meet both conditions at once: i.e. the system is over-determined. Equilibrium may not 
be attainable via price adjustment. The crux of the matter is not simply that prices should be 
free to express existing conditions of demand and supply: rather it is these conditions, 
specifically conditions of demand for output, not prices per se, that are “wrong”.  
 
The Morishima perspective (his emphasis on possible over-determination) is, we can say, 
relevant to any income-expenditure system, whether modelled in classical or Walrasiann 
terms. What matters for macro stability is whether demand for output automatically matches 
the value of what is produced, or being independently determined, can take a value which 
exceeds or falls short of that of the output available for purchase. Only in the case of a closed 
system, governed by Say’s Law, is the aggregate demand function guaranteed to be “tame” 
and the correspondence of the value aggregate demand and of aggregate supply certain. If 
the conditions of production and the factors which determine planned aggregate demand are 
not compatible, in the absence (as in the Keynesian system) of any automatic adjustment 
mechanism, positive government intervention may be needed to change the parameters of 
the system, by directly creating demand and by altering the climate of business confidence 
and expectations. 
 
A summing up 
 
To recap briefly on the argument so far. Neoclassical theory (pre-Keynes) made much of the 
idea that the economy possesses a natural tendency to equilibrium with full employment and 
that the free working of the price mechanism could be expected to generate that state of 
affairs. Ceteris paribus, flexibility of real wages (free movement of the labour supply curve) 
would ensure full employment of labour, and the so-called “interest rate mechanism” would 
establish a “natural” rate of interest and which savings and intended investment would 
balance: all labour (allowing for temporary, frictional unemployment of people between 
jobs) would be employed and all output produced by that labour would be purchased either 
for consumption or investment purposes. However, if wages were sticky, or the rate of 
interest failed to adjust as it should, the occurrence of unemployment could be expected.  
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None of this Keynes accepted: his diagnosis attributes lack of employment to lack of 
demand for output, not excessive real wages; he rejected the notion of the interest rate 
equilibrating mechanism, finding the rate of interest to be of a different nature and to play a 
different role from that attributed to it in the conventional theory. For Keynes, aggregate 
demand for output, an independent and potentially troublesome variable was the important 
determinant of the level of activity: trouble in the form of unemployment was not due to 
inflexibility of wages or interest rates. When the suggestion was advanced that downward 
flexibility of the general price level might help boost aggregate demand in recession, he had 
no time for such a notion – more likely, he (and other authorities) thought that, with 
bankruptcies and expectations of further price decline, deflation would worsen rather than 
improve the situation. Finally, we emphasise that not only are these specific instances of 
price adjustment beside the point as regards the question of full employment, even if interest 
rates, real wages and the price level were to be as flexible as might be wished, such 
adjustments may not be enough. We have noted the contention that, in the case of a surplus-
producing economy operating in a world of uncertainty, it is probable that the system is 
overdetermined, in which case it may be impossible, under existing circumstances, that all 
conditions of equilibrium can, at the same time, be satisfied. Price flexibility is therefore no 
longer the be-all and the end-all.  
 
Thus we have arrived at a peculiarly Keynesian understanding – that the direct implication 
of bringing human decision-making into such a context is that an aggregate investment 
function must be regarded as an independent determining factor -“untamed” and unreliable: 
consequently, there is no room for Say’s Law. The “natural” state of the system need not be 
one of full employment, rather it corresponds to the levels of output and employment as 
determined by aggregate demand - recognizing that, under real world conditions of 
uncertainty, aggregate demand is determined independently of, and may not be consistent 
with, aggregate supply. 
 
Current theoretical fashion 
But fashionable opinion, as propounded today in the standard macro texts, is dramatically 
different from that of the Keynesian era. The analytical model which presently dominates 
undergraduate macroeconomics teaching – the “ADAS” model. returns to the pre-Keynes 
focus on price flexibility as the means of maintaining full employment. This construction, 
widely employed in the textbook literature, puts the whole emphasis on price adjustment as 
the mechanism by which full employment equilibrium is ensured. Disequilibrium is 
attributed to wage and price inflexibility; recovery, it is alleged, is ensured by appropriate 
price adjustment.
11 
______________________ 
11
 For fuller discussion of the incoherent nature and the inadequacies of the ADAS model see Grieve (1998, 
2010), Moseley (2010) and Rao (1998). 
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As readers will be aware, the ADAS model consists (diagrammatically) of two curves: (i) an 
AD (“aggregate demand”) function  which  purports  to  show  real  aggregate  demand as an     
inverse function of the price level and (ii) an AS (“aggregate supply”) function; the later 
comes in two forms  - as a vertical long-run AS curve which indicates that in the longer-term 
output is independent of the price level and a positively-sloped short-run AS curve which 
represents output as, in the short-run, varying positively with the price level. 
 
On both the demand and supply sides of the model, everything depends on the degree of 
price  flexibility.  Changes  in  the  volume  of  monetary  expenditure  affect  output  and 
employment only if money prices change in a greater proportion than money wages, so 
causing real wages to alter, and thus (according to this purely “classical” analysis)  affecting 
employment and output. For employment to return to the “natural rate” money wages have 
to catch up with the change in prices. Likewise, on the AD side, the degree of price 
flexibility is critical: subsequent to some change in spending (represented by a shift of the 
AD curve, the real value of expenditure can be restored to compatibility with the volume of 
employment as determined in the (neoclassical) labour market by an appropriate degree of 
deflation (or inflation, as the case might be). Again we can say - from this theoretical 
perspective - all that is required to re-establish equilibrium at full employment is the 
appropriate adjustment of real wages (money wages relative to prices) and of the price level. 
Pas de probléme! 
As regards the above ADAS story – two matters of concern, both involving the facile 
supposition that  price  changes  guarantee  correction  of disequilibrium - are evident.  We  
have  here  a  reversion to the old pre-Keynesian model of the labour market, in which 
employment is determined by the level of real wages against the marginal product of labour 
schedule, so that unemployment is explained by excessive real wages due to an inappropriate 
position of the labour supply curve (wage demands are too high). The positively-sloped AD 
curve implies the complete neglect of all the reservations expressed in the past about the 
wealth effect on demand – price level adjustment is blindly presented as an effective means 
of changing (increasing) aggregate demand. This is a model  which  has  no  room  either for 
an aggregate demand function which is independent of aggregate supply, or for any notion of 
involuntary unemployment. It is important also, when the ADAS model is under discussion, 
to be aware that that the construction is fundamentally incoherent. The model is unfit for 
purpose.
12 
______________________________
 
12 
It is worth noting that the AD/AS hotchpotch has been equally condemned from a purist New Classical 
perspective. Thus Barro and Grilli (1994, p.428):The main problem with the AS-AD framework is that the 
various pieces of the model are contradictory. The AD curve reflects the underlying IS/LM model . . . The 
AS curve assumes  that producers (and workers) can sell their desired quantities at the going price P. That is 
why the quantity rises when P increases relative to P
e 
(the expected price level). This set-up is inconsistent 
with the Keynesian idea – present in the IS/LM model and therefore in the AD curve – that producers and 
workers are constrained by aggregate demand in their ability to sell goods and services. 
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Each curve, AD (which is derived from ISLM) and AS (which represents the pre-Keynesian, 
Say’s Law theory of employment) in fact constitutes what David Collander describes as  an 
“aggregate equilibrium curve”,  meaning  that  the  two  parts  of  the  model, AD and AS, 
simultaneously describe different equilibrium levels of output as corresponding to the same 
price level. Not only therefore is the ADAS model made of component parts involving 
heavy and unpersuasive reliance on the efficacy of price adjustment (of real wages and of the 
price level) to correct disequilibrium states, the component elements represent rival, 
alternative macro theories, and are consequently incompatible. 
 
Conclusions 
It has been our purpose to question the common presumption that (downward) flexibility of 
wages  and  prices  is   enough  to  ensure  –  at  least  eventually  –   the  attainment  of  full 
employment. Too little attention, we conclude, is paid to the possibility that, even with wage 
and price flexibility, such adjustments may be incapable of reconciling demand and supply 
throughout the economy so as to generate full employment. The problem may be of a more 
fundamental nature than one of mere stickiness of prices which prevents the ready 
attainment of an existing set of market clearing values. It may well be the case, in a world of 
uncertainty, with saving and investment, that, in given circumstances, no set of equilibrium 
prices actually exists to be reached through the free functioning of the price mechanism: the 
problem is not simply that prices fail to adjust, but that the state of aggregate demand is 
incompatible with the conditions of labour supply. What is required is a fundamental change 
in the state of those factors – namely current expenditure plans – which determine the level 
of activity within the economy. We suggest that the convention of taking it as “reasonable” 
to assume the existence of a set of equilibrium values ceases to be reasonable if the 
Walrasian general equilibrium approach is extended beyond its initial application to the case 
of shipwrecked  mariners swapping goods on a desert island beach. Decision making in the 
real world is much more fraught and difficult: socially optimal outcomes cannot be 
guaranteed. Sticky wages or prices are not the relevant constraints on recovery; inflexibility 
in the downward direction of money wages and prices may actually, as Keynes suggested, be 
beneficial, contributing to stability rather than inhibiting adjustment to full employment 
equilibrium. 
 
We note too it is unfortunate that so much macroeconomic discussion is today commonly 
conducted in   terms   of   a   theoretical  model  which  cannot  but  confuse.   The presently 
fashionable ADAS construction has rightly been condemned as a muddled hybrid which 
should have no place in macro analysis. The whole conception implies, in the macro context, 
an inappropriate analogy with market adjustment at the microeconomic level. Not only that, 
each of the incompatible individual parts of the model involves unjustifiable assumptions 
about the benign consequences of price effects  –  changes  of  real  wages  on  employment, 
changes in the price level on aggregate demand. To explain changes in employment by 
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reference to changes in real wages takes us back to the days of Professor Pigou:  to  presume 
that deflation will have a positive effect on aggregate demand is to overlook much 
theoretical discussion and empirical evidence which points to the contrary conclusion. The 
presumption that price flexibility ensures full employment turns the theoretical clock back 
eighty years. 
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